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Preface 
 
In this book we introduce a new procedure called α-
Discounting Method for Multi-Criteria Decision Making (α-D 
MCDM), which is as an alternative and extension of Saaty’s 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). It works for any number 
of preferences that can be transformed into a system of 
homogeneous linear equations. A degree of consistency (and 
implicitly a degree of inconsistency) of a decision-making 
problem are defined. α-D MCDM is afterwards generalized to 
a set of preferences that can be transformed into a system of 
linear and/or non-linear homogeneous and/or non-
homogeneous equations and/or inequalities. 
Many consistent, weak inconsistent, and strong 
inconsistent examples are given. 
In Chapter 1, it is presented the general idea of α-D MCDM, 
which is to assign non-null positive parameters α1, α2, …, αp 
to the coefficients in the right-hand side of each preference 
that diminish or increase them in order to transform the 
above linear homogeneous system of equations which has 
only the null-solution, into a system having a particular non-
null solution. 
After finding the general solution of this system, the 
principles used to assign particular values to all parameters 
α’s is the second important part of α-D, yet to be deeper 
investigated in the future. 
In the current chapter we herein propose the Fairness 
Principle, i.e. each coefficient should be discounted with the 
same percentage (we think this is fair: not making any 
Florentin Smarandache 
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favouritism or unfairness to any coefficient), but the reader 
can propose other principles. 
For consistent decision-making problems with pairwise 
comparisons, α-Discounting Method together with the 
Fairness Principle give the same result as AHP. 
But for weak inconsistent decision-making problem, α -
Discounting together with the Fairness Principle give a 
different result from AHP. 
α-Discounting/Fairness-Principle together give a 
justifiable result for strong inconsistent decision-making 
problems with two preferences and two criteria; but for 
more than two preferences with more than two criteria and 
the Fairness Principle has to be replaced by another principle 
of assigning numerical values to all parameters α’s. 
In Chapter 2 we present three new examples of using the 
α-Discounting Multi-Criteria Decision Making Method in 
solving non-linear problems involving algebraic equations 
and inequalities in the decision process. 
Chapter 3 is an extension of our previous work on α-
Discounting Method for MCDM from crisp numbers to 
intervals. 
 
The author. 
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Abstract 
In this chapter we introduce a new procedure called α-
Discounting Method for Multi-Criteria Decision Making (α-D 
MCDM), which is as an alternative and extension of Saaty’s 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). It works for any number 
of preferences that can be transformed into a system of 
homogeneous linear equations. A degree of consistency (and 
implicitly a degree of inconsistency) of a decision-making 
problem are defined.  
α-D MCDM is generalized to a set of preferences that can be 
transformed into a system of linear and/or non-linear 
homogeneous and/or non-homogeneous equations and/or 
inequalities. 
Many consistent, weak inconsistent, and strong 
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Introduction 
α-Discounting Method for Multi-Criteria Decision Making 
(α-D MCDM) is an alternative and extension of Saaty’s 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) - see [1-11] for more 
information on AHP since it is not the main subject of this 
chapter.  It works not only for preferences that are pairwise 
comparisons of criteria as AHP does, but for preferences of 
any n-wise (with n≥2) comparisons of criteria that can be 
expressed as linear homogeneous equations.  
The general idea of α-D MCDM is to assign non-null 
positive parameters α1, α2, …, αp to the coefficients in the 
right-hand side of each preference that diminish or increase 
them in order to transform the above linear homogeneous 
system of equations which has only the null-solution, into a 
system having a particular non-null solution.  
After finding the general solution of this system, the 
principles used to assign particular values to all parameters 
α’s is the second important part of α-D, yet to be deeper 
investigated in the future. In the current chapter we herein 
propose the Fairness Principle, i.e. each coefficient should be 
discounted with the same percentage (we think this is fair: 
not making any favouritism or unfairness to any coefficient), 
but the reader can propose other principles. 
For consistent decision-making problems with pairwise 
comparisons, α-Discounting Method together with the 
Fairness Principle give the same result as AHP. But for weak 
inconsistent decision-making problem, α-Discounting 
together with the Fairness Principle give a different result 
from AHP.  
α-Discounting Method for Multi-Criteria Decision Making (α-D MCDM) 
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α-Discounting/Fairness-Principle together give a 
justifiable result for strong inconsistent decision-making 
problems with two preferences and two criteria; but for 
more than two preferences with more than two criteria and 
the Fairness Principle has to be replaced by another principle 
of assigning numerical values to all parameters α’s. 
Since Saaty’s AHP is not the topic of this chapter, we only 
recall the main steps of applying this method, so the results 
of α-D MCDM and of AHP could be compared. 
AHP works only for pairwise comparisons of criteria, from 
which a square Preference Matrix, A (of size nn), is built. 
Then one computes the maximum eigenvalue  max of A and 
its corresponding eigenvector.   
If  max is equal to the size of the square matrix, then the 
decision-making problem is consistent, and its 
corresponding normalized eigenvector (Perron-Frobenius 
vector) is the priority vector. 
If  max is strictly greater than the size of the square matrix, 
then the decision-making problem is inconsistent. One raise 
to the second power matrix A, and again the resulted matrix 
is raised to the second power, etc. obtaining the sequence of 
matrices A2, A4, A8, …, etc. In each case, one computes the 
maximum eigenvalue and its associated normalized 
eigenvector, until the difference between two successive 
normalized eigenvectors is smaller than a given threshold. 
The last such normalized eigenvector will be the priority 
vector.   
Saaty defined the Consistency Index as: 
CI(A) = 
max( )
1
A n
n
 

, 
where n is the size of the square matrix A. 
Florentin Smarandache 
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α-Discounting Method for Multi-Criteria Decision 
Making (α-D MCDM) 
Description of α-D MCDM 
The general idea of this chapter is to discount the 
coefficients of an inconsistent problem to some percentages 
in order to transform it into a consistent problem. 
Let the Set of Criteria be C = {C1, C2, …, Cn}, with n ≥ 2,  
and the Set of Preferences be P = {P1, P2, …, Pm}, with m ≥ 1. 
Each preference Pi is a linear homogeneous equation of the 
above criteria C1, C2, …, Cn: 
Pi = f(C1, C2, …, Cn). 
We need to construct a basic belief assignment (bba):  
m: C  [0, 1] 
such that m(Ci) = xi , with 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, and   
1 1
( ) 1
n n
i i
i i
m C x
 
   . 
We need to find all variables xi in accordance with the set 
of preferences P. 
Thus, we get an m˟n linear homogeneous system of 
equations whose associated matrix is  
A = (aij), 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ n. 
In order for this system to have non-null solutions, the 
rank of the matrix A should be strictly less than n. 
 
Classification of Linear Decision-Making Problems 
a) We say that a linear decision-making problem is 
consistent if, by any substitution of a variable xi from an 
equation into another equation, we get a result in 
agreement with all equations. 
α-Discounting Method for Multi-Criteria Decision Making (α-D MCDM) 
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b) We say that a linear decision-making problem is 
weakly inconsistent if by at least one substitution of a 
variable xi from an equation into another equation we get 
a result in disagreement with at least another equation in 
the following ways:  
(WD1)  
1
2 2 2 1
, 1;
, 1,
i j
i j
x k x k
x k x k k k


  
 
   
 
or 
(WD2)  
1
2 2 2 1
,0 1;
,0 1,
i j
i j
x k x k
x k x k k k


   
 
    
 
or 
(WD3)   , 1i ix k x k   
(WD1)-(WD3) are weak disagreements, in the sense that 
for example a variable x > y always, but with different ratios 
(for example: x=3y and x=5y). 
c) All disagreements in this case should be like (WD1)-
(WD3). 
We say that a linear decision-making problem is 
strongly inconsistent if, by at least one substitution of a 
variable xi from an equation into another equation, we get a 
result in disagreement with at least another equation in the 
following way:  
(SD4)  
1
2
;
,
i j
i j
x k x
x k x


 
 
 
 
with 0 < k1 < 1 < k2 or 0 < k2 < 1 < k1 (i.e. from one equation 
one gets xi < xj while from the other equation one gets the 
opposite inequality: xj  < xi). 
Florentin Smarandache 
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At least one inconsistency like (SD4) should exist, no 
matter if other types of inconsistencies like (WD1)-(WD3) 
may occur or not. 
Compute the determinant of A 
a) If det(A)=0, the decision problem is consistent, since the 
system of equations is dependent. 
It is not necessarily to parameterize the system. {In the 
case we have parameterized, we can use the Fairness 
Principle – i.e. setting all parameters equal  1 =  2 = … = 
p =  > 0}.  
Solve this system; find its general solution.  
Replace the parameters and secondary variables, getting a 
particular solution. 
Normalize this particular solution (dividing each 
component by the sum of all components). 
Wet get the priority vector (whose sum of its components 
should be 1). 
b) If det(A) 0, the decision problem is inconsistent, since 
the homogeneous linear system has only the null-
solution. 
b1) If the inconsistency is weak, then parameterize the 
right-hand side coefficients, and denote the system matrix 
A(α). 
Compute det(A(α)) = 0 in order to get the parametric 
equation. 
If the Fairness Principle is used, set all parameters equal, 
and solve for  > 0. 
Replace  in A(α) and solve the resulting dependent 
homogeneous linear system. 
α-Discounting Method for Multi-Criteria Decision Making (α-D MCDM) 
 13 
Similarly as in a), replace each secondary variable by 1, 
and normalize the particular solution in order to get the 
priority vector. 
b2) If the inconsistency is strong, the Fairness Principle 
may not work properly.  Another approachable principle 
might be designed. 
Or, get more information and revise the strong 
inconsistencies of the decision-making problem. 
Comparison between AHP and α-D MCDM 
a) α-D MCDM’s general solution includes all particular 
solutions, that of AHP as well; 
b) α-D MCDM uses all kind of comparisons between 
criteria, not only paiwise comparisons; 
c) for consistent problems, AHP and α-D MCDM/Fairness-
Principle give the same result; 
d) for large inputs, in α-D MCDM we can put the equations 
under the form of a matrix (depending on some parameters 
alphas), and then compute the determinant of the matrix 
which should be zero; after that, solve the system (all can be 
done on computer using math software); the software such 
as MATHEMATICA and MAPPLE for example can do these 
determinants and calculate the solutions of this linear 
system; 
e) α-D MCDM can work for larger classes of preferences, 
i.e. preferences that can be transformed in homogeneous 
linear equations, or in non-linear equations and/or 
inequalities – see more below. 
Florentin Smarandache 
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Generalization of α-D MCDM 
Let each preference be expressed as a linear or non-linear 
equation or inequality. All preferences together will form a 
system of linear/non-linear equations/inequalities, or a 
mixed system of equations and inequalities. 
Solve this system, looking for a strictly positive solution 
(i.e. all unknowns xi > 0). Then normalize the solution vector. 
If there are more such numerical solutions, do a 
discussion: analyze the normalized solution vector in each 
case. 
If there is a general solution, extract the best particular 
solution by replacing the secondary variables by some 
numbers such that the resulting particular solution is 
positive, and then normalizing. 
If there is no strictly positive solution, parameterize the 
coefficients of the system, find the parametric equation, and 
look for some principle to apply in order to find the numerical 
values of the parameters α’s  
A discussion might also be involved. We may get 
undetermined solutions. 
 
Degrees of Consistency and Inconsistency in α-D 
MCDM/Fairness-Principle 
For  -D MCDM/Fairness-Principle in consistent and 
weak consistent decision-making problems, we have the 
followings:  
a) If  0 <   < 1, then  is the degree of consistency of 
the decision-making problem, and  β = 1- is the degree of 
inconsistency of the decision-making problem. 
α-Discounting Method for Multi-Criteria Decision Making (α-D MCDM) 
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b) If  > 1, then 1/ is the degree of consistency of the 
decision-making problem, and β = 1-1/ is the degree of 
inconsistency of the decision-making problem. 
  
Principles of α-D MCDM (Second Part) 
a) In applications, for the second part of  -D Method, 
the Fairness Principle can be replaced by other principles.   
Expert’s Opinion.  For example, if we have information that 
a preference’s coefficient should be discounted twice more 
than another coefficient (due to an expert’s opinion), and 
another preference’s coefficient should be discounted a third 
of another one, then appropriately we set for example:  1= 
2 2 and respectively  3 = (1/3) 4, etc. in the parametric 
equation. 
b) For  -D/Fairness-Principle or Expert’s Opinion.  
Another idea herein is to set a threshold of consistency 
tc (or implicitly a threshold of inconsistency ti).  Then, if the 
degree of consistency is smaller than a required tc, the 
Fairness Principle or Expert’s Opinion (whichever was used) 
should be discharged, and another principle of finding all 
parameters  ’s should be designed; and similarly if the 
degree of inconsistency is bigger than ti. 
c) One may measure the system’s accuracy (or error) for 
the case when all m preferences can be transformed into 
equations; for example, preference Pi is transformed into an 
equation fi(x1, x2, …, xn)=0; then we need to find the 
unknowns x1, x2, …, xn such that: 
e(x1, x2, …, xn) = 
m
i 1 2 n
i=1
 |f (x , x , ..., x )|  is minimum, 
Florentin Smarandache 
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where “e(…)” means error. 
Calculus theory (partial derivatives) can be used to find 
the minimum (if this does exist) of a function of n variables, 
e(x1, x2, …, xn), with e: R+n  R+. 
For consistent decision-making problems the system’s 
accuracy/error is zero, so we get the exact result.  
We prove this through the fact that the normalized 
priority vector [a1 a2 … an], where xi=ai > 0 for all i, is a 
particular solution of the system fi(x1, x2, …, xn)=0 for i=1, 2, 
…, m; therefore:  
m
i 1 2 n
i=1 1
 |f (a , a , ..., a )| | 0 | 0.
m
i
    
But, for inconsistent decision-making problems we find 
approximations for the variables. 
 
Extension of α-D MCDM (Non-Linear α-D MCDM) 
It is not difficult to generalize the α-D MCDM for the case 
when the preferences are non-linear homogeneous (or even 
non-homogeneous) equations. 
This non-linear system of preferences has to be dependent 
(meaning that its general solution – its main variables - 
should depend upon at least one secondary variable).   
If the system is not dependent, we can parameterize it in 
the same way.  Then, again, in the second part of this Non-
Linear α-D MCDM we assign some values to each of the 
secondary variables (depending on extra-information we 
might receive), and we also need to design a principle which 
will help us to find the numerical values for all parameters. 
α-Discounting Method for Multi-Criteria Decision Making (α-D MCDM) 
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We get a particular solution (such extracted from the general 
solution), which normalized will produce our priority vector. 
Yet, the Non-Linear α-D MCDM is more complicated, and 
depends on each non-linear decision-making problem. 
Let us see some examples. 
 
Consistent Example 1 
A. We use the α-D MCDM. Let the Set of Preferences be:
 1, 2, 3C C C  
and The Set of Criteria be: 
1. 1C  is 4 times as important as 2C . 
2. 2C  is 3 times as important as 3.C  
3. 3C  is one twelfth as important as 1C . 
Let ( 1)m C x , ( 2)m C y , ( 3)m C z . 
The linear homogeneous system associated to this 
decision-making problem is: 
4
3
12
x y
y z
x
z

 



 

 
whose associated matrix A1 is: 
1 4 0
0 1 3
1/12 0 1
 
 
 
  
,  
whence det(A1) = 0, so the DM problem is consistent. 
Florentin Smarandache 
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Solving this homogeneous linear system we get its general 
solution that we set as a solution vector [12z  3z   z], where z 
can be any real number (z is considered a secondary variable, 
while x=12z and y=3z are main variables). 
Replacing z=1 into the solution vector, the solution vector 
becomes [12  3  1], and then normalizing (dividing by 
12+3+1=16 each vector component) we get the priority 
vector: [12/16   3/16   1/16], so the preference will be on C1. 
B. Using AHP, we get the same result. 
The preference matrix is: 
1 4 12
1/ 4 1 3
1/12 1/3 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
whose maximum eigenvalue is  max = 3 and its 
corresponding normalized eigenvector (Perron-Frobenius 
vector) is [12/16   3/16   1/16]. 
C. Using Mathematica 7.0 Software: 
Using MATHEMATICA 7.0 software, we graph the 
function: 
h(x,y) = |x-4y|+|3x+4y-3|+|13x+12y-12|, with x,y[0,1], 
which represents the consistent decision-making problem’s 
associated system: 
x/y=4, y/z=3, x/z=12, and x+y+z=1, x>0, y>0, z>0. 
In[1]:= 
Plot3D[Abs[x-4y]+Abs[3x+4y-3]+Abs[13x+12y-
12],{x,0,1},{y,0,1}] 
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The minimum of this function is zero, and occurs for 
x=12/16, y=3/16. 
If we consider the original function of three variables 
associated with h(x,y) we have:  
H(x,y, z) = |x-4y|+|y-3z|+|x-12z|, x+y+z=1, with x,y,z[0,1], 
we also get the minimum of H(x,y,z) being zero, which occurs 
for x=12/16, y=3/16, z=1/16. 
 
Weak Inconsistent Examples where AHP does not work  
The Set of Preferences is 1, 2, 3C C C . 
Weak Inconsistent Example 2 
α-D MCDM method. 
The Set of Criteria is: 
1. 1C  is as important as 2 times 2C  plus 3 times 3C . 
2. 2C  is half as important as 1C . 
3. 3C  is one third as important as 1C . 
Florentin Smarandache 
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Let ( 1)m C x , ( 2)m C y , ( 3)m C z ; 
2 3
2
3
x y z
x
y
x
z

  






 
AHP cannot be applied on this example because of the 
form of the first preference, which is not a pairwise 
comparison. 
If we solve this homogeneous linear system of equations 
as it is, we get x=y=z=0, since its associated matrix is: 
1 2 3
1/ 2 1 0 1 0
1/ 3 0 1
  
 
    
  
 
but the null solution is not acceptable since the sum x+y+z 
has to be 1. 
Let us parameterise each right-hand side coefficient and 
get the general solution of the above system: 
1 2
3
4
2 3                                                          (1)
                                                                    (2)
2
                                              
3
x y z
y x
z x
 


 

                       (3)








 
where 1 2 3 4, , , 0     . 
Replacing (2) and (3) in (1) we get  
3 4
1 22 3
2 3
x x x
 
 
   
    
  
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 1 3 2 41 x x        
whence  
1 3 2 4 1      (parametric equation)  (4) 
 The general solution of the system is: 
3
4
 
2
3
y x
z x





 

 
whence the priority vector: 
3 34 4          1          
2 3 2 3
x x x
     
   
   
. 
 Fairness Principle: discount all coefficients with the 
same percentage: so, replace  
1 2 3 4 0          in (4) we get 
2 2 1   , 
whence 
2
2
  . 
 Priority vector becomes: 
2 2
1          
4 6
 
 
 
 
and normalizing it: 
 0.62923    0.22246    0.14831
     1           2            3
                                   
C C C
x y z
 
Preference will be on C1, the largest vector component. 
Let us verify it: 
0.35354
y
x
  instead of 0.50, i.e. 
2
70.71%
2
  of the original. 
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0.23570
z
x
  instead of 0.33333, i.e. 70.71% of the original. 
1.41421 2.12132x y z   instead of 2 3y z , i.e. 70.71% of 2 
respectively 70.71% of 3. 
So, it was a fair discount for each coefficient.  
Using Mathematica 7.0 Software. 
Using MATHEMTICA 7.0 software, we graph the function: 
g(x,y) = |4x-y-3|+|x-2y|+|4x+3y-3|, with x,y[0,1], 
which represents the weak inconsistent decision-making 
problem’s associated system: 
x-2y-3z=0, x-2y=0, x-3z=0, and x+y+z=1, x>0, y>0, z>0. 
by solving z=1-x-y and replacing it in  
G(x,y,z)= |x-2y-3z|+|x-2y|+|x-3z| with x>0, y>0, z>0, 
In[2]:= 
Plot3D[Abs[4x-y-3]+Abs[x-2y]+Abs[4x+3y-
3],{x,0,1},{y,0,1}] 
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Then find the minimum of g(x,y) if any: 
In[3]:= 
FindMinValue[{Abs[4x-y-3]+Abs[x-2y]+Abs[4x+3y-
3],x+y≤1,x>0,y>0},{x,y}] 
The following result is returned: 
Out[3]:= 0.841235. 
FindMinValue::eit: The algorithm does not converge to the 
tolerance of 4.806217383937354`*^-6 in 500 iterations. The 
best estimated solution, with feasibility residual, KKT 
residual, or complementary residual of {0.0799888, 
0.137702,0.0270028}, is returned.  
Matrix Method of using α-Discounting 
The determinant of the homogeneous linear system (1), 
(2), (3) is: 
   
1 2
3 2 4 1 3
4
  1      2      3
1
    1              0 1 0 0 0
2
1
    0              1
3
 
    

 
      

 
or 
1 3 2 4 1      (parametric equation). 
The determinant has to be zero in order for the system to 
have non-null solutions. 
The rank of the matrix is 2. 
So, we find two variables, for example it is easier to solve 
for y  and z  from the last two equations, in terms of x : 
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3
4
1
2
1
3
y x
z x





 

 
and the procedure follows the same steps as in the previous 
one. 
Let us change Example 1 in order to study various 
situations. 
Weak Inconsistent Example 3 
This is more weakly inconsistent than Example 2. 
1. Same as in Example 2. 
2. 2C  is 4 times as important as 1C  
3. Same as in Example 2. 
1 2
3
4
2 3  
4  
 
3
x y z
y x
z x
 



  



 

 
  41 3 22 4 3
3
x x x

  
 
   
 
 
 1 3 2 41 8x x       
1 3 2 48 1      (parametric equation) 
1 2 3 4 0.          
2 19 1
3
     
4 4
3 3     4      1     4      
3 3
x x x
 
 
   
   
   
 
4 1 9 12 1
1                    
3 9 9 9 9
   
   
    ;
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normalized: 
9 12 1
          
22 22 22
 
 
  .
 
1.333
y
x
  instead of 4; 
0.111
z
x
 instead of 0.3333; 
0.667 1x y z    instead of 2 3y z . 
Each coefficient was reduced at  
1
33.33%
3
 . 
 The bigger is the inconsistency  1  , the bigger is 
the discounting  0  . 
 
Weak Inconsistent Example 4 
This is even more inconsistent than Example 3. 
1. Same as in Example 2. 
2. Same as in Example 3. 
3. 3C  is 5 times as important as 1C . 
1 2
3
4
2 3  
4  
5  
x y z
y x
z x
 


 


 
 
   1 3 2 42 4 3 5x x x      
 1 3 2 41 8 15x x      
whence 1 3 2 48 15 1      (parametric equation). 
1 2 3 4 0,          
223 1  , 
23
23
   
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 3 4
4 23 5 23
1     4      5 1         
23 23
 
 
  
 
 
Normalized:  0.34763   0.28994   0.36243  
0.83405
y
x
  instead of 4, i.e. reduced at 
23
20.85%
23
  
1.04257
z
x
  instead of 5 
0.41703 0.62554x y z    instead of 2 3x y . 
Each coefficient was reduced at 
23
20.85%
23
   . 
 
Consistent Example 5 
When we get 1  , we have a consistent problem. 
Suppose the preferences: 
1. Same as in Example 2. 
2. 2C  is one fourth as important as 1C . 
3. 3C  is one sixth as important as 1C . 
The system is: 
2 3
4
6
x y z
x
y
x
z

  





  
 
First Method of Solving this System 
Replacing the second and third equations of this system 
into the first, we get: 
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2 3
4 6 2 2
x x x x
x x
   
       
   
, 
which is an identity (so, no contradiction). 
General solution: 
          
4 6
x x
x
 
 
 
 
Priority vector: 
1 1
1          
4 6
 
 
 
 
Normalized is:  
12 3 2
          
17 17 17
 
 
 
 
Second Method of Solving this System 
Let us parameterize: 
1 2
3
4
2 3
4
 
6
x y z
y x
z x
 



  






 
Replacing the last two equations into the first we get: 
3 1 34 2 4
1 22 3
4 6 2 2
x x x x x
    
 
   
     
  
 
1 3 2 41
2
x x
   
   , 
whence 1 3 2 41
2
   
  or 1 3 2 4 2     . 
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Consider the fairness principle: 1 2 3 4 0         , 
then 22 2  , 1   , but we take only the positive value 
1   (as expected for a consistent problem). 
Let us check: 
3
117
12 4
17
y
x
  , exactly as in the original system; 
2
117
12 6
17
z
x
  , exactly as in the original system; 
2 3x y z   since 2 3
4 6
x x
x
   
    
   
; 
hence all coefficients were left at 1  (=100%) of the 
original ones. No discount was needed. 
  
General Example 6 
Let us consider the general case: 
1 2
3
4
x a y a z
y a x
z a x
 


 
 
where 1 2 3 4, , , 0a a a a   
Let us parameterize: 
1 1 2 2
3 3
4 4  
x a y a z
y a x
z a x
 


 


 
 
with 1 2 3 4, , , 0     . 
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Replacing the second and third equations into the first, we 
get: 
   1 1 3 3 2 2 4 4x a a x a a x      
1 3 1 3 2 4 2 4x a a x a a x      
whence 
1 3 1 3 2 4 2 4 1a a a a      (parametric equation) 
The general solution of the system is:  
 3 43 4,  a ,  ax x x   
The priority vector is  3 43 41  a  a  . 
 Consider the fairness principle: 
1 2 3 4 0          
We get: 
2
1 3 2 4
1
a a a a
 

, 
so, 
   
1 3 2 4
1
a a a a
 

 
i) If  0,1  , then  is the degree of consistency of the 
problem, while 1    is the degree of the inconsistency of 
the problem. 
ii) If 1  , then 
1

 is the degree of consistency, while 
1
1

   is the degree of inconsistency. 
When the degree of consistency 0 , the degree of 
inconsistency 1 , and reciprocally. 
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Discussion of the General Example 6 
Suppose the coefficients 1 2 3 4, , ,a a a a become big such that 
1 3 2 4a a a a  , then 0  , and 1  . 
Particular Example 7. 
Let us see a particular case when 1 2 3 4, , ,a a a a  make 
1 3 2 4a a a a  big: 
1 2 3 450,   20,   100,   250a a a a    , 
then 
1 1 1
0.01
10050 100 20 250 10000
    
  
 = degree 
of consistency, whence 0.99   degree of inconsistency. 
The priority vector for Particular Example 7 is: 
   1  100(0.01)  250(0.01) 1  1  2.5  
which normalized is: 
2 2 5
    
9 9 9
 
 
 
. 
Particular Example 8. 
Another case when 1 2 3 4, , ,a a a a  make the expression 
1 3 2 4a a a a  a tiny positive number: 
1 2 3 40.02,   0.05,   0.03,   0.02a a a a    , then 
   
1 1
25 1
0.040.02 0.03 0.05 0.02
    
  
. 
Then 
1 1
0.04
25
   is the degree of consistency of the 
problem, and 0.96 the degree of inconsistency. 
The priority vector for Particular Example 8 is: 
     3 41    1  0.03(25)  0.02(25) 1  0.75  0.50a a     
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which normalized is 
4 3 3
    
9 9 9
 
 
 
. 
Let us verify:   
3 4
0.75
9 9
y
x
    instead of 0.03, i.e. 25   times larger (or 
2500%);   
2 4
0.50
9 9
z
x
    instead of 0.02, i.e. 25 times larger; 
0.50 1.25x y z   instead of 0.02 0.05x y z   (0.50 is 25 
times larger than 0.02, and 1.25 is 25 times larger than 0.05) 
because
4 3 2
0.50 1.25
9 9 9
   
    
   
. 
Jean Dezert’s Weak Inconsistent Example 9 
Let 1 2 3, , 0     be the parameters. Then: 
   
1
1 2 1 2
2
3
(5)    3    
3 4 12
  (6)    4  
(7)    5  
y
y x yx
x x z z
z
y
z

   


 
 
      
 




 
In order for 1 212
y
z
   to be consistent with 35  
y
z
  we 
need to have 1 2 312 5     
or 1 2 32.4    (Parametric Equation)  (8) 
Solving this system: 
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1 1
2 2
3 1 2
3 3
4 4
5 12
y
y x
x
x
x z
z
y
y z
z
 
 
  

   


   


  

 
we get the general solution: 
   2 1 24    5 2.4    z z z      
   2 1 24    12    z z z    
General normalized priority vector is: 
2 1 2
2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
4 12 1
      
4 12 1 4 12 1 4 12 1
  
        
 
 
      
 
where 1 2, 0   ; ( 3 1 22.4   ). 
Which 1  and 2  give the best result?  How to measure it?  
This is the greatest challenge! 
 -Discounting Method includes all solutions (all possible 
priority vectors which make the matrix consistent). 
Because we have to be consistent with all proportions (i.e. 
using the Fairness Principle of finding the parameters’ 
numerical values), there should be the same discounting of 
all three proportions (5), (6), and (7), whence  
1 2 3 0       (9) 
The parametric equation (8) becomes 2
1 12.4   or  
2
1 12.4 0   ,  1 12.4 1 0    , 
whence 1 0   or 1
1 5
2.4 12
   .  
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1 0   is not good, contradicting (9). 
Our system becomes now: 
5 15
3                                                                               (10)
12 12
5 20
4                                                                               (11)
12 12
5 2
5
12
y
x
x
z
y
z
  
  
  
5
                                                                               (12)
12









 
We see that (10) and (11) together give  
  
15 20
 
12 12
y x
x z
    or 
25
12
y
z
 , 
so, they are now consistent with (12). 
From (11) we get 
20
12
x z  and from (12) we get
25
12
y z .  
The priority vector is: 
20 25
      1
12 12
z z z
 
 
 
 
which is normalized to: 
20 20
2012 12  
20 25 20 25 12 57
1
12 12 12 12 12
 
   
,    
25
2512
57 57
12
 ,    
1 12
57 57
12
 , i.e. 
1 2 3            
20 25 12
      
57 57 57
C C C
T
 
 
 
  (13) 
 
1 2 3
the highest priority
                                 
0.3509   0.4386   0.2105
                     
             
C C C
T


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Let us study the result: 
1 2 3            
20 25 12
      
57 57 57
                
C C C
T
x y z
 
 
 
 
 
Ratios:    Percentage of Discounting: 
25
2557 1.25
20 20
57
y
x
    instead of 3;  1
25
520 41.6%
3 12
    
20
20 557 1.6
12 12 3
57
x
z
     instead of 4; 1
20
512 41.6%
4 12
    
 
25
2557 2.083
12 12
57
y
z
    instead of 5; 1
25
512 41.6%
5 12
  
 
Hence all original proportions, which were respectively 
equal to 3, 4, and 5 in the problem, were reduced by 
multiplication with the same factor 1
5
12
  , i.e. by getting 
41.6%  of each of them. 
So, it was fair to reduce each factor to the same percentage 
41.6%  of itself. 
But this is not the case in Saaty’s method: its normalized 
priority vector is  
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 
1 2 3                        
0.2797   0.6267   0.0936
                               
C C C
T
x y z
, 
where: 
Ratios:    Percentage of Discounting: 
0.6267
2.2406
02797
y
x
   instead of 3;  
2.2406
74.6867%
3
  
0.2797
2.9882
0.0936
x
z
  instead of 4; 
2.9882
74.7050%
4
  
06267
6.6955
0.0936
y
z
   instead of 5; 
6.6955
133.9100%
5
  
Why, for example, the first proportion, which was equal to 
3, was discounted to 74.6867%  of it, while the second 
proportion, which was equal to 4, was discounted to another 
percentage (although close) 74.7050%  of it? 
Even more doubt we have for the third proportion’s 
coefficient, which was equal to 5, but was increased to 
133.9100%  of it, while the previous two proportions were 
decreased; what is the justification for these?  
That is why we think our α-D/Fairness-Principle is better 
justified. 
We can solve this same problem using matrices. (5), (6), 
(7) can be written in another way to form a linear 
parameterized homogeneous system:  
1
2
3
3                     = 0
                     - 4 0
                    5 0
x y
x z
y z






  
  (14) 
whose associated matrix is: 
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1
1 2
3
3      1          0
   1         0      - 4
   0         1      5
P



 
 
  
  
  (15) 
a) If 1det( ) 0P   then the system (10) has only the null 
solution 0x y z   . 
b) Therefore, we need to have 1det( ) 0P  , or 
  1 2 33 4 5 0    , or 1 2 32.4 0    , so we get the 
same parametric equation as (8). 
In this case the homogeneous parameterized linear 
system (14) has a triple infinity of solutions. 
This method is an extension of Saaty’s method, since we 
have the possibility to manipulate the parameters 1 2,  , and 
3 . For example, if a second source tells us that 
x
z
 has to be 
discounted 2 times as much as 
y
x
, and 
y
z
 should be 
discounted 3 times less than 
y
x
, then we set 2 12  , and 
respectively 13
3

  , and the original (5), (6), (7) system 
becomes: 
 
1
2 1 1
1
3 1
3
4 =4 2 =8  
5
5 =5 =  
3 3
y
x
x
z
y
z

  

 






  
  
 
  (16) 
and we solve it in the same way. 
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Weak Inconsistent Example 10 
Let us complicate Jean Dezert’s Weak Inconsistent 
Example 9. with one more preference: 2C  is 1.5 times as 
much as 1C  and 3C  together.  
The new system is: 
3
4
5
1.5( )
, , [0,1]
1
y
x
x
z
y
z
y x z
x y z
x y z



 


 

  

 

  
  (17) 
We parameterized it: 
1
2
3
4
1 2 3 4
3
4
5
1.5 ( )
, , [0,1]
1
, , , 0
y
x
x
z
y
z
y x z
x y z
x y z




   



 


 

  

 

  

  (18) 
Its associated matrix is: 
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1
2
2
3
4 4
3     1      0
  1        0    -4
  0        1    - 5
1.5   -1    1.5
P



 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (19) 
The rank of matrix 2P should be strictly less than 3 in order 
for the system (18) to have non-null solution. 
If we take the first three rows in (19) we get the matrix 1P
whose determinant should be zero, therefore one also gets 
the previous parametric equation 1 2 32.4   . 
If we take rows 1, 3, and 4, since they all involve the 
relations between 2C  and the other criteria 1C  and 3C  we get 
1
3 3
4 4
3     1      0
  0        1    - 5
1.5   -1    1.5
P


 
 
 
  
  
 (20) 
whose determinant should also be zero: 
       3 1 4 3 4 1 3det 3  1.5 5 1.5 0 0 3 5 0P                  
1 4 3 4 1 34.5 7.5 15 0           (21) 
If we take  
  
2
4 3
4 4
1         0    - 4
0        1    - 5
1.5   -1    1.5
P


 
 
 
  
  
  (22) 
Then 
     4 4 2 4 3 4 2 4 3det 1.5  0 0 6 5 0 1.5 6 5 0P                    (23) 
If we take  
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1
5 2
4 4
3     1   0
  1        0    - 4
1.5   -1    1.5
P


 
 
 
  
  
  (24) 
then 
     5 2 4 1 2 4 2 4 1 2 4det 0 0 6 0 12 1.5 6 12 1.5 0P                   (25) 
So, these four parametric equations form a parametric 
system: 
1 2 3
1 4 3 4 1 3
4 2 4 3
2 4 1 2 4
2.4 0
4.5 7.5 15 0
1.5 6 5 0
6 12 1.5 0
  
     
   
    
 

  

  
   
  (26) 
which should have a non-null solution. 
If we consider 1 2 3
5
0
12
       as we got at the 
beginning, then substituting all α’s into the last three 
equations of the system (26) we get: 
4 4 4
5 5 5 5 25
4.5 7.5 15 0 0.52083
12 12 12 12 48
  
      
           
      
4 4 4
5 5
1.5 6 5 0 0.52083
12 12
  
   
       
   
 
4 4 4
5 5 5
6 12 1.5 0 0.52083
12 12 12
  
    
        
    
 
4  could not be equal to 1 2 3     since it is an extra 
preference, because the number of rows was bigger than the 
number of columns. So the system is consistent, having the 
same solution as previously, without having added the fourth 
preference  1.5y x z  . 
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Jean Dezert’s Strong Inconsistent Example 11 
The preference matrix is: 
1
1
1   9   
9
1
   1   9
9
1
9      1
9
M
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
so,  
9 ,
1
,
9
9 ,
x y x y
x z x z
y z y z
 


 

 
 
The other three equations: 1 1,   9 ,   
9 9
y x z x z y    result 
directly from the previous three ones, so we can eliminate 
them. 
From x>y and y>z (first and third above inequalities) we 
get x>z, but the second inequality tells us the opposite: x<z; 
that is why we have a strong contradiction/inconsistency. Or, 
if we combine all three we have x>y>z>x… strong 
contradiction again. 
Parameterize:
1
2
3
9                                                                           (27)
1
                                                                         (28)
9
9                           
x y
x z
y z





                                                  (29) 






 
where 1 2 3, , 0    . 
From (27) we get: 
1
1
 
9
y x

 , from (28) we get 
2
1
9
z x

 , 
which is replaced in (29) and we get:  
α-Discounting Method for Multi-Criteria Decision Making (α-D MCDM) 
 41 
3
3
2 2
819
9  =y x x


 
 
  
 
. 
So 3
1 2
811
 
9
x x

 
  or 2 1 3729    (parametric equation). 
The general solution of the system is: 
1 2
1 9
,  , 
9
x x x
 
 
 
 
 
The general priority vector is: 
   
1 2
1 9
1    
9 
 
 
 
. 
Consider the fairness principle, then 1 2 3 1        
are replaced into the parametric equation: 2729  , 
whence 0   (not good) and 
3
1 1
729 9
   . 
The particular priority vector becomes 
 2 41     9      9 1     81     6561     
and normalized  
1 81 6561
          
6643 6643 6643
 
 
 
 
Because the consistency is 
1
0.00137
729
    is extremely 
low, we can disregard this solution (and the inconsistency is 
very big 1 0.99863).     
 
Remarks 
a) If in 1M  we replace all six 9’s by a bigger number, the 
inconsistency of the system will increase. Let us use 11. 
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Then 
3
1
0.00075
11
    (consistency), while inconsistency
0.99925  . 
b) But if in 1M we replace all 9’s by the smaller positive 
number greater than 1, the consistency decreases. Let us 
use 2. Then 
3
1
0.125
2
   and 0.875  ; 
c) Consistency is 1 when replacing all six 9’s by 1. 
d) Then, replacing all six 9’s by a positive sub unitary 
number, consistency decreases again. For example, 
replacing by 0.8 we get 
3
1
1.953125 1
0.8
    , whence 
1
0.512

  (consistency) and 0.488   (inconsistency). 
 
Jean Dezert’s Strong Inconsistent Example 12 
The preference matrix is: 
2
1
1   5   
5
1
   1   5
5
1
5      1
5
M
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
which is similar to 1M where we replace all six 9’s by 5’s. 
3
1
0.008
5
    (consistency) and 0.992   (inconsistency). 
The priority vector is  2 41  5   5 1  25  625      
and normalized 
1 25 625
    
651 651 651
 
 
 
. 
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2M  is a little more consistent than 1M  because 0.00800 > 
0.00137, but still not enough, so this result is also discarded. 
Generalization of Jean Dezert’s Strong Inconsistent 
Examples 
General Example 13.  
Let the preference matrix be: 
1
1      
1
   1   t
1
t      1
t
t
t
M
t
t
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
, 
with 0t  , and ( )tc M  the consistency of tM , ( )ti M  
inconsistency of tM . 
We have for the Fairness Principle: 
1
lim ( ) 1t
t
c M

  and  
1
lim ( ) 0t
t
i M

 ; 
lim ( ) 0t
t
c M

  and  lim ( ) 1t
t
i M

 ; 
0
lim ( ) 0t
t
c M

  and  
0
lim ( ) 1t
t
i M

 . 
Also 
3
1
t
  , the priority vector is 2 41      t t    which is 
normalized as  
  
2 4
2 4 2 4 2 4
1
      
1 1 1
t t
t t t t t t
 
 
      
.  
In such situations, when we get strong contradiction of the 
form x>y>z>x or similarly x<z<x, etc. and the consistency is 
tiny, we can consider that x=y=z=1/3 (so no criterion is 
preferable to the other – as in Saaty’s AHP), or just x+y+z=1 
(it means that one has the total ignorance too: C1C2C3). 
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Strong Inconsistent Example 14 
Let C = {C1, C2}, and P = {C1 is important twice as much as 
C2;  C2 is important 5 times as much as C1}.  Let m(C1)=x, 
m(C2)=y.  Then: x=2y and y=5x (it is a strong inconsistency 
since from the first equation we have x>y, while from the 
second y>x). 
Parameterize: x=2α1y, y=5α2x, whence we get 
2α1=1/(5α2), or 10α1α2=1. 
If we consider the Fairness Principle, then α1= α2= α>0, 
and one gets α = 
10
10
≈ 31.62% consistency; priority vector 
is [0.39 0.61], hence y>x. An explanation can be done as in 
paraconsistent logic (or as in neutrosophic logic): we 
consider that the preferences were honest, but subjective, 
therefore it is possible to have two contradictory statements 
true simultaneously since a criterion C1 can be more 
important from a point of view than C2, while from another 
point of view C2 can be more important than C1.  In our 
decision-making problem, not having any more information 
and having rapidly being required to take a decision, we can 
prefer C2, since C2 is 5 times more important that C1, while 
C1 is only 2 times more important than C2, and 5>2. 
If it’s no hurry, more prudent would be in such dilemma to 
search for more information on C1 and C2. 
If we change Example 14 under the form: x=2y and y=2x 
(the two coefficients set equal), we get α = ½, so the priority 
vector is [0.5 0.5] and decision-making problem is 
undecidable.  
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Non-Linear Equation System Example 15 
Let C = {C1, C2, C3}, m(C1)=x, m(C2)=y, m(C3)=z. 
Let F be: 
1. C1 is twice as much important as the product of C2 
and C3. 
2. C2 is five times as much important as C3. 
We form the non-linear system:  x=2yz (non-linear 
equation) and y=5z (linear equation). 
The general solution vector of this mixed system is: [10z2   
5z   z], where z>0. 
A discussion is necessary now. 
a) You see for sure that y>z, since 5z>z for z strictly 
positive. But we don’t see anything what the position of x 
would be? 
b) Let us simplify the general solution vector by dividing 
each vector component by z>0, thus we get: [10z   5   1]. 
If  z(0, 0.1), then y>z>x. 
If z=0.1, then y>z=x. 
If z(0.1, 0.5), then y>x>z. 
If z=0.5, then y=x>z. 
If z>0.5, then x>y>z. 
Non-Linear/Linear Equation/Inequality Mixed System 
Example 16 
Since in the previous Example 15 has many variants, 
assume that a new preference comes in (in addition to the 
previous two preferences): 
1. C1 is less important than C3. 
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The mixed system becomes now: x=2yz (non-linear 
equation), y=5z (linear equation), and x<z (linear inequality). 
The general solution vector of this mixed system is: [10z2   
5z   z], where z>0 and 10z2 < z. From the last two inequalities 
we get z(0, 0.1). Whence the priorities are: y>z>x. 
 
Future Research 
To investigate the connection between α-D MCDM and 
other methods, such as: the technique for order preference 
by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) method, the simple 
additive weighting (SAW) method, Borda-Kendall (BK) 
method for aggregating ordinal preferences, and the cross-
efficiency evaluation method in data envelopment analysis 
(DEA). 
Conclusion 
We have introduced a new method in the multi-criteria 
decision making,  - Discounting MCDM. In the first part of 
this method, each preference is transformed into a linear or 
non-linear equation or inequality, and all together form a 
system that is resolved – one finds its general solution, from 
which one extracts the positive solutions.  If the system has 
only the null solution, or it is inconsistent, then one 
parameterizes the coefficients of the system. 
In the second part of the method, one chooses a principle 
for finding the numerical values of the parameters {we have 
proposed herein the Fairness Principle, or Expert’s Opinion 
on Discounting, or setting a Consistency (or Inconsistency) 
Threshold}. 
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Three Non-linear α-Discounting MCDM-
Method Examples 
 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter we present three new examples of using the 
α-Discounting Multi-Criteria Decision Making Method in 
solving non-linear problems involving algebraic equations 
and inequalities in the decision making process.  
 
Keywords 
• α-Discounting MCDM-Method • non-linear decision making 
problems • 
 
Introduction 
We have defined a new procedure called  -Discounting 
Method for Multi-Criteria Decision Making (α-D MCDM), which 
is as an alternative and extension of Saaty’s Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP). We have also defined the degree of 
consistency (and implicitly a degree of inconsistency) of a 
decision-making problem [1].  
The α-D MCDM can deal with any set of preferences that 
can be transformed into an algebraic system of linear and/or 
non-linear homogeneous and/or non-homogeneous 
equations and/or inequalities. 
We discuss below three new examples of non-linear 
decision making problems. 
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Example 1 
The Set of References is 1 2 3C ,C ,C . 
1. 1C  is as important as the product of 2C and 3C . 
2. The square of 2C  is as important as 3C . 
3. 3C  is less important than 2C . 
We denote 1 2 3C x, C y, C z , and we’ll obtain the 
following non-linear algebraic system of two equations and 
one inequality: 
2
x yz
y z
z y
 
and of course the conditions 
1
0 1
x y z
x, y,z ,
 
From the first two equations we have: 
2 3x yz y y y  
and 2z y  whence the general priority vector is 3 2y  y  y . 
We consider 0y , because if 0y  the priority vector 
becomes 0 0 0   which does not make sense.  
Dividing by y  we have 2 1y    y , and normalized: 
  
2
2 2 2
1
1 1 1
y y
    
y y y y y y
. 
From 2y z  and z y  we have  
2y y  or 2 0y y  or 1 0y y , hence 0 1y , . 
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For 0 1y ,  we have the order: 
2
2 2 2
1
1 1 1
y y
y y y y y y
 
so 2 3 1C C C . 
 
Example 2 
The Set of References is also 1 2 3C ,C ,C . 
1. 1C  is as important as the square of 2C . 
2. 2C  is as important as double 3C . 
3. The square of 3C is as important as triple 1C . 
We again denote 1 2 3C x, C y, C z , and we’ll obtain 
the following non-linear algebraic system of three equations: 
2
2
2
3
x y
y z
z x
 
If we solve it, we get: 
  
2
2
2
2
4
4 0 0 0
3
3
x z
z
z z y x .z
x
 
Algebraically the only solution is 0 0 0  , but the null 
solution is not convenient for MCDM. 
Let’s parameterize, i.e. “discount” each equality: 
2
2 2 21
1 2 1 2
22
1 2
32 2
3
3
2 4
2 1
4
31
3
3
x α y
x α α z α α z
y α z
α α
α
z α x x z
α
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or 2
1 2 312 1α α α , which is the characteristic parametric 
equation needed for the consistency of this algebraic system. 
The general algebraic solution in this parameterized case 
is: <4α1α22z2   2α2z   z>. 
Using the Fairness Principle as in the α-Discounting MCDM 
Method, we set all parameters equal:  
1 2 3α α α α  
whence, from the characteristic parametric equation, we 
obtain that 
412 1α , 
therefore  
4
4
1 1
0 537
12 12
α . .
 
Thus the general solution for the Fairness Principle is: 
<4α3z2   2αz   z > 
and, after substituting α ≈ 0.537, it results: 
3 2 24 0 619
2 1 074
x α z . z
y αz . z.
 
Whence the general solution for the Fairness Principle 
becomes: 
3 2 24 2 0 619 1 074α z   αz   z . z   . z   z
 
and dividing by z ≠ 0 one has:
 
0 619 1 074. z, . , 1 .
 
But y = 1.074 > 1 = z, hence y > z. 
Discussion: 
1. If 
1
1.616
0.619
z   , then y > z > x. 
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2. If 
1
1.616
0.619
z   , then y > z = x. 
3. If 
1 1.074
0.619 0.619
z  or 1.616 < z < 1.735, then y > x > z.  
4. If 
1.074
1.735
0.619
z   , then x = y > z.  
5. If 
1.074
1.735
0.619
z   , then x > y > z.  
From the orders of x, y, and z it results the corresponding 
orders between the preferences C1, C2, and C3. 
 
Example 3 
Let’s suppose that the sources are not equally reliable. 
First source is five times less reliable than the second, 
while the third source is twice more reliable that the second 
one. Then the parameterized system: 
  
2
1
2
2
3
2
3
x α y
y α z
z α x
 becomes  
2
2
2
2 2
3
2
3
4
x α y
y α z
α
z x
 
since 1 23α α  which means that we need to discount the first 
equation three times more than the second, and 23
4
α
α  
which means that we need to discount the third equation a 
quarter of the second equation’s discount. 
Denote 2α α , then: 
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2
2
3
2
3
4
x αy
y αz
α
z x
 
whence 
  
2 3 23 2 12x α αz α z  
and 
  2
4
3
x z
α
 
therefore 
  3 2 2
4
12
3
α z z
α
, or 436 4α  
Thus  
  
4
1
0 485
9
α . . 
The algebraic general solution is: 
3 2 2 1 55712 2 1 557 0 970 0 854 1
1 557 1 854
. z
α z  αz  z = . z   . z  z =  .   .
. z .
 
And in a similar way, as we did for Example 2, we may 
discuss upon parameter z > 0 the order of preferences C1, C2, 
and C3. 
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Interval α-Discounting Method for MDCM 
 
Abstract 
This chapter is an extension of our previous work on α-
Discounting Method for MCDM ([1], [2], [3]) from crisp 
numbers to intervals. 
Keywords 
• Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) • Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) • α-Discounting Method • Fairness 
Principle • parameterize • pairwise comparison • n-wise 
comparison • consistent MCDM problem • inconsistent 
MCDM problem • 
 
Introduction 
In 2010 we have introduced a new method [3], called α-
Discounting Method for Multi Criteria Decision Making, 
which is an alternative but also a generalization of Saaty’s 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP).  α-Discounting Method 
works for any n-pairwise comparisons, n ≥ 2, that may be 
linear or non-linear, or may be equations or inequalities. It 
transforms all preferences into a system of equations and/or 
of inequalities, that is later solved algebraically.  
Since Saaty’s AHP is not the topic of this chapter, we’ll not 
present over here. Neither our α-Discounting Method for 
Multi Criteria Decision Making is recalled.  The interested 
reader may get them in [7], and respectively [1], [2], and [3]. 
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A consistent example 
Let have the set of criteria be 𝐶 = {𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝐶3}, and the set 
of preferences 𝑃 be: 
1. 𝐶1 is twice or three times as important as 𝐶2; 
2. 𝐶2 is one or one and half times as important as 𝐶3. 
Solution 
Let 𝑥 represents the value of 𝐶, 𝑦 of 𝐶2, and 𝑧 of 𝐶3. 𝑥 >
0, 𝑦 > 0, 𝑧 > 0. 
We form the algebraic interval system: 
{
𝑥 = [2, 3]𝑦
𝑦 = [1, 1.5]𝑧,
 
where [2, 3] and [1, 1.5] are intervals. 
Replacing the second equation into the first, one gets: 
𝑥 = [2, 3]𝑦 = [2, 3] ∙ [1, 1.5]𝑧 = [2 ∙ 1, 3 ∙ 1.5]𝑧 = [2, 4.5]𝑧. 
The general solution of this system is: 
〈[2, 4.5]𝑧, [1, 1.5]𝑧, 𝑧〉 where 𝑧 > 0. 
We divide this vector components by 𝑧, and we get: 
〈[2, 4.5], [1, 1.5], 1〉
𝐶1         𝐶2       𝐶3
. 
We don’t know exactly what to mean by normalization 
when dealing with intervals, but it is clear that 𝐶1 > 𝐶2 > 𝐶3. 
 
A second consistent example 
Criteria: 𝐶 = {𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝐶3}, and the set of preferences 𝑃, 
same as in the previous example, but adding one more: 
1. 𝐶1 is twice or three times as important as 𝐶2; 
2. 𝐶2 is one or one and half times as important as 𝐶3; 
3. 𝐶3 is 
1
4
 or 
1
2
 times as important as 𝐶1 . 
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Solution 
With same notations 𝑥, 𝑧 and 𝑧 representing the values of 
𝐶1, 𝐶2 and respectively 𝐶3, we form the algebraic system: 
{
𝑥 = [2, 3] ∙ 𝑦
𝑦 = [1, 1.5] ∙ 𝑧
𝑧 = [0.25, 0.50] ∙ 𝑥,
 
with 𝑥 > 0, 𝑦 > 0, 𝑧 > 0. 
The determinant of the system is: 
|
1 −[2, 3] 0
0 1 −[1, 1.5]
−[0.25, 0.50] 0 1
| = |
1 [−3, −2] 0
0 1 [−1,5, −1]
[−0.50, −0.25] 0 1
|
= 1— [−3, −2] ∙ [−0.50, −0.25]
= [1, 1]+][(−3) ∙ (−1.59) ∙ (−0.5), (2) ∙ (−1)
∙ (−0.25)] = [1, 1] + [−2.25, −0.50]
= [1 − 2.25, 1 − 0.50] = [−1.25, 0.50]
≠ [0, 0]. 
Let’s parameterize the system, using 𝛼1 > 0, 𝛼2 > 0, 𝛼3 >
0 in order to discount each interval coefficient. We get: 
{
𝑥 = 𝛼1[2, 3]𝑦
𝑦 = 𝛼2[1, 1.5]𝑧
𝑧 = 𝛼3[0.25, 0.50]𝑥.
 
The determinant of the parameterized system is: 
|
1 −𝛼1[2, 3] 0
0 1 −𝛼2[1, 1.5]
−𝛼3[0.25, 0.50] 0 1
|
= 1 − 𝛼1𝛼2𝛼3[2, 3][1, 1.5][0.25, 0.50]
= [1, 1] − 𝛼1𝛼2𝛼3[0.50, 2.25] = [0,0]. 
Whence 𝛼1𝛼2𝛼3[0.50, 2.25] = [1, 1], hence 𝛼1𝛼2𝛼3 =
[
1
2.25
,
1
0.50
] = [
4
9
, 2]. 
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For equitable discount, let 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 𝛼 > 0. Then 
𝛼3 = [
4
9
, 2], whence 𝛼 = [√4/9
3 , √2
3
] ≃ [0,76, 1.26]. 
There, the system is altered with the same proportion 𝛼 =
[0,76, 1.26] each equation, and it becomes: 
{
𝑥 = [2, 3] ∙ 𝛼 ⋅ 𝑦 = [2, 3] ∙ [0.76, 1.26]𝑦 = [1.52, 3.78]𝑦
𝑦 = [1, 1.5] ∙ 𝛼 ⋅ 𝑧 = [1, 1.5] ∙ [0.76, 1.26]𝑧 = [0.76, 1.89]𝑧
𝑧 = [0.25, 0.50] ∙ 𝛼 ⋅ 𝑥 = [0.25, 0.50] ∙ [0.76, 1.26]𝑥 = [0.19, 0.63]𝑥
 
From the first two equations we get: 
{
𝑥 = [1.52, 3.78]𝑦 = [1.52, 3.78] ∙ [0.76, 1.89]𝑧 = [1.16, 7.14]𝑧
𝑦 = [0.76, 1.89]𝑧
 
The third equation 
1 ∙ 𝑧 = [0.19, 0.63]𝑥 
is equivalent to  
𝑥 =
1
[0.19, 0.63]
𝑧 = [
1
0.63
,
1
0.19
] 𝑧 = [1.59, 5.26]𝑧. 
Therefore we got the following approximation that we can 
call reconciliation of the first equations together, that give us: 
𝑥 = [1.16, 7.14]𝑧 
with respect to the third equation that gives us: 
𝑥 = [1.59, 5.26]𝑧. 
We see that the intervals [1.16, 7.14] and [1.59, 5.26] are 
close to each other. 
The solution vector of the parameterized system, for 𝛼 =
[0.76, 1.26] is 
〈[1.16, 7.14]𝑧 or[1.59, 5.26]𝑧, [0.76, 1.89]𝑧, 𝑧〉. 
We divide by 𝑧 > 0 and we get: 
〈[1.16, 7.14] or [1.59, 5.26], [0.76, 1.89], 1〉.
  𝐶1                                                          𝐶2   𝐶3
 
It’s not necessary to normalize. We can see that: 
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𝐶1 > 𝐶2 and 𝐶1 > 𝐶3. 
To compare 𝐶2 with 𝐶3, we see that in general 
𝐶2 > 𝐶3, 
since the interval [0.76, 1.89] has a bigger part which is 
(1, 1.89] > 1 when 𝐶2 > 𝐶3, 
and a smaller part [0.76, 1) when 𝐶2 > 𝐶3, while a single case 
[1, 1] = 1 when 𝐶2 = 𝐶3. 
Inconsistent example 
Same criteria and the first two preferences. Only the third 
preference is changed as in the below third equation. 
{
𝑥 = [2, 3]𝑦
𝑦 = [1, 1.5]𝑧
𝑧 = [3, 3.5]𝑥.
 
From first and second equations, we get 
𝑥 = [2, 3]𝑦 = [2, 3], [1, 1.5]𝑧 = [2, 4.5]𝑧. 
From the last equation: 
𝑥 =
1
[3, 3.5]
= [
1
3.5
,
1
3
] ≃ [0.29, 0.33]𝑧 
which is different from [2, 4.5]𝑧. 
Parameterized in the same way as before: 
{
𝑥 = 𝛼1[2, 3]𝑦
𝑦 = 𝛼2[1, 1.5]𝑧
𝑧 = 𝛼3[3, 3.5]𝑥.
 
We similarly get from the first two equations: 
𝑥 = 𝑐[2, 4.5]𝑧 
and from the last equation: 
𝑥 =
1
[3, 3.5]
∙
1
𝛼3
≃
1
𝛼3
[0.29, 0.33]𝑧. 
Whence: 
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𝛼1𝛼2[2, 4.5]𝑧 =
1
𝛼3
[0.29, 0.33]𝑧 
Or 𝛼1𝛼2𝛼3[2, 4.5] = [0.29, 0.33], 
hence 
𝛼1𝛼2𝛼3 =
[0.29, 0.33]
2, 4.5]
= [
0.29
4.5
,
0.33
2
] ≃ [0.064, 0.165]. 
Considering an equitable discount we set 
𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 𝛼 > 0, 
hence 𝛼1𝛼2𝛼3 = [0.064, 0.165] 
becomes 𝛼3 = [0.064, 0.165], 
whence 𝛼 = [√0.064
3
, √0.165
3
] ≃ [0.400, 0.548]. 
Whence we get: 
𝑥 = 𝛼1𝛼2[2, 4.5]𝑧 = [0.400, 0.548][0.400, 0.548][2, 4.5]𝑧
= [0.32, 1.55]𝑧 
or 
𝑥 =
1
𝛼3
[0.29, 0.33]𝑧 =
1
[0.400, 0.548]
∙ [0.29, 0.33]𝑧
= [
0.24
0.548
,
0.33
0.400
] 𝑧 = [0.529, 0.825]𝑧 
and 
𝑦 = 𝛼2[1, 1.5]𝑧 = [0.400, 0.548][1, 1.5]𝑧 = [0.400, 0.822]𝑧. 
The solution of the parameterized system is: 
〈[0.32, 1.55]𝑧 or [0.529, 0.825]𝑧, [0.400, 0.822]𝑧, 𝑧〉. 
We divide by 𝑧 > 0 and we get: 
〈[0.32, 1.55]or [0.529, 0.825], [0.400, 0.822], 1〉
                              𝐶1                                        𝐶2 𝐶3
. 
Clearly 𝐶2 < 𝐶3. 
Florentin Smarandache 
60 
Then 𝐶1 < 𝐶3 for most part of its values, i.e. for [0.32, 1) or 
[0.529, 0.825] and 𝐶1 > 𝐶3for (1, 1.55) while 𝐶1 = 𝐶3 for [1, 
1]. To compare 𝐶1 and 𝐶2 it is more complicated. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have constructed two consistent 
examples and one inconsistent example of decision making 
problems, where the preferences use intervals instead of 
crisp numbers in comparisons of preferences. The results 
are, of course, more complicated. 
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In this book we introduce a new procedure called α-Discounting Method 
for Multi-Criteria Decision Making (α-D MCDM), which is as an alternative 
and extension of Saaty’s Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). It works for 
any number of preferences that can be transformed into a system of 
homogeneous linear equations. A degree of consistency (and implicitly a 
degree of inconsistency) of a decision-making problem are defined. α-D 
MCDM is afterwards generalized to a set of preferences that can be 
transformed into a system of linear and/or non-linear homogeneous and/or 
non-homogeneous equations and/or inequalities. 
The general idea of α-D MCDM is to assign non-null positive parameters 
α1, α2, …, αp to the coefficients in the right-hand side of each preference that 
diminish or increase them in order to transform the above linear 
homogeneous system of equations which has only the null-solution, into a 
system having a particular non-null solution. After finding the general 
solution of this system, the principles used to assign particular values to all 
parameters α’s is the second important part of α-D, yet to be deeper 
investigated in the future. 
In the current book we propose the Fairness Principle, i.e. each 
coefficient should be discounted with the same percentage (we think this is 
fair: not making any favoritism or unfairness to any coefficient), but the 
reader can propose other principles. 
For consistent decision-making problems with pairwise comparisons, α-
Discounting Method together with the Fairness Principle give the same 
result as AHP. 
But for weak inconsistent decision-making problem, α-Discounting 
together with the Fairness Principle give a different result from AHP. 
Many consistent, weak inconsistent, and strong inconsistent examples 
are given in this book. 
